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Political Conflicts, the Role of Opposition Parties, and the
Limits on Taxation
Stephane Wolton
London School of Economics and Political Science
Abstract
In democratic systems, the rich have diverse channels through which they can influence
policies. In a model of taxation, I study the capacity of the rich to constrain the fiscal choice
of a government by starting a costly political conflict (for example, a press campaign), which
imposes a cost on the government and influences the fate of the government’s fiscal plan.
I show that the government’s tax proposal depends critically on the marginal disutility of
taxation for the rich. This approach provides a new rationale for the empirically documented
U-shaped relationship between inequality and taxation. It also highlights a new role for
opposition parties. By agreeing to bear part of the cost of a political conflict in exchange for
compromise, the opposition makes Pareto-improving arrangements possible.
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1
In May 1924 in France, a coalition of left-wing parties the Cartel des Gauches won the general
election with a promise to tackle a mounting public debt problem through capital taxation. In July
1926, as demonstrations were staged in front of the French Parliament and monetary panic spread,
the Cartel was replaced by a center-right coalition. During the Cartel’s tenure, the rich and the
business community strongly opposed any attempt by the government to impose a capital levy.
This opposition took the form of capital evasion and a massive press campaign against a capital
tax, eventually swaying public opinion against the governing coalition.1
It is well understood that the poor have the capacity to constrain the rich in autocracies (Ace-
moglu and Robinson, 2005). In unconsolidated democracies, the rich might exert undue influence
by threatening coups or unrest (Ellman and Wantchekon, 2000; Dal Bo´ and di Tella, 2003). In
consolidated democracies, the rich can use contributions (e.g., Rodriguez, 2004) or independent
expenditures (as the Koch brothers’ support for Governor Walker illustrates). As the example of
the Cartel illustrates, the rich also have the capacity to constrain the fiscal policy of a government
opposed to their interests by taking actions that hurt the party or coalition of parties in power.
In this paper, I study this last channel of influence in a stylized model of taxation. A government
(referred to by the pronoun “he” throughout) chooses a tax level under the threat of political conflict
by the rich who dislike redistribution. A political conflict is costly to organize for the rich, and this
cost is their private information (for example, it can depend on their ability to coordinate their
actions). It has two effects on the government. First, it imposes a direct utility loss (for example,
due to the cost of mounting a public relation campaign to defend the government’s plan or the
increased risk of losing the next election). Second, with some probability, a political conflict forces
the government to abandon his fiscal project (for example, it might sway public opinion against
the government’s tax proposal as in the case of the Cartel des Gauches).
The government chooses his tax rate to equate the marginal gain from a higher tax rate with
the marginal cost of increased risk of a political conflict. Consequently, a key variable to explain
the government’s tax proposal is the marginal disutility of taxation for the rich. When the marginal
disutility is low, the government proposes his ideal tax rate; when it is high, the government prefers
to maintain the status quo tax rate; in the intermediate range, the government compromises with
the rich.
The introduction of political conflict has two important consequences for our understanding
of democracy. First, it highlights an understudied role of opposition parties. Like the rich, the
opposition (referred to by the pronoun “she” throughout) favors a tax rate lower than the status
quo. Like the government, she does not know the cost of a political conflict to the rich. The
government can form a coalition with the opposition. In this case, the opposition bears part
of the cost of a political conflict in exchange for a more moderate fiscal proposal (endogenously
determined). The government always chooses to form a coalition with the opposition when the
marginal disutility of taxation for the rich is sufficiently high. The risk of a political conflict is
high, and a reduction in its cost is advantageous for the government even if it means passing a
more moderate proposal.
I show that the possibility to form a coalition with the opposition makes Pareto-improving ar-
rangements possible. The government is better off since he has a greater choice set. The opposition
is never worse off since she would reject any fiscal proposal to form a coalition that leads to a lower
expected payoff than if they were not to form a coalition. The rich are better off because the
coalition leads to a more moderate tax proposal that benefits them directly.
Second, this paper explains why taxation does not necessarily increase inequality, as has previ-
ously been empirically documented (for a review, see Alesina and Glaeser, 2004). Because of the
risk of political conflict, the level of taxation decreases with the marginal disutility of taxation for
the rich (with or without a government-opposition coalition). All else equal, an increase in inequal-
ity (driven by an increase in the income of the rich) has two conflicting effects on the marginal
disutility of taxation. The first effect is a level effect: For a given tax rate, the amount taxed
increases. This effect tends to increase the marginal disutility of taxation. The second effect is a
marginal effect: As the rich become richer, the value of each additional dollar to the rich decreases.
This effects tends to decrease the marginal disutility of taxation. Under certain conditions, at a
low level of inequality, the level effect dominates, and the tax rate decreases with inequality. At a
high level of inequality, the marginal effect dominates, and the tax rate increases with inequality.
Consequently, the relationship between inequality and taxation can be U-shaped, as empirically
documented by Figini (1999) and de Melo and Tiongson (2006).
Related literature
This paper joins a line of research investigating how the rich influence fiscal policies in democ-
racy. Roemer (1999) and Lee and Roemer (2006) show that the rich can avoid full expropriation
of their wealth by manipulating the electoral agenda. Several papers analyze how the rich can buy
favorable tax policies from the government with contributions (Rodriguez, 2004), bribes (Dal Bo´
and di Tella, 2003) or threats of violence (Dal Bo´ et al., 2006). Be´nabou (2000) demonstrates how
unequal participation in politics can translate into a low level of redistribution when markets are
imperfect. This paper complements this literature by considering an additional channel of influ-
ence. The rich can undertake costly actions (start a political conflict) which impose a utility loss on
the government and might force him to abandon his fiscal project. This new approach highlights
another important variable affecting fiscal policy: the marginal disutility of taxation for the rich,
which helps explain the empirically documented U-shaped relationship between inequality and the
level of redistribution (Figini, 1999; de Mello and Tiongson, 2006).2
This paper also contributes to literature that explores the role of the opposition party or chal-
lenger in democracy. In most formal models, the opposition is a passive alternative to the party
or individual in power (for example, Canes-Wrone et al., 2001). Dewan and Hortala-Vallve (2013a
and b) and Ashworth and Shotts (2014) show how the presence of an opposition providing infor-
mation to voters about her or the government’s competence influences the government’s policy
choices. Iaryczower and Oliveros (2014) show how a minority party can help broker deals between
a majority party and the opposition. Dewan and Spirling (2011) analyze how an opposition party
can lead to more moderate policies by imposing cohesion among its members. In the present work,
the opposition has a similar effect by forming a coalition and bearing part of the cost of political
conflict in exchange for a more moderate tax proposal. In addition, I find that the possibility to
form a coalition is Pareto-improving.3
The baseline model
I first consider a two-player game with a government and the rich, where players have divergent
preferences regarding the level of taxation. The government’s ideal tax rate is τg ∈ (τsq, 1], where
τsq ≥ 0 is the status quo tax rate. The ideal tax rate of the rich is τr ∈ [0, τsq].4 The government
proposes a tax rate b ∈ [0, 1], where 0 corresponds to no tax and 1 to full taxation. After observing
the government’s fiscal proposal, the rich decide whether to start a political conflict ar ∈ {0, 1}
which affects the final tax rate implemented τ . A political conflict is costly for the rich with cost
cr, and this cost is their private information. However, it is common knowledge that it is drawn
from a Uniform distribution [0, 1]. (I assume a uniform distribution to simplify the analysis.)
A political conflict can take the form of a press campaign against the government fiscal plan (as
in the case of the Cartel des Gauches described in the introduction) or a grassroots campaign (such
as mobilizing partisans to send letters to their representative). It captures the efforts by the rich
to activate and sway “latent opinion” (V.O. Key, 1961).5 Since public reaction is unpredictable
(V.O. Key, 1961: 267), I assume that with exogenous probability p > 0, public opinion sides with
the rich and forces the government to abandon his fiscal project and uphold the status quo tax
rate: τ = τsq. Otherwise, the government’s tax proposal is passed: τ = b. A political conflict also
imposes a direct utility loss of k > 0 on the government. This loss captures the government’s cost
of defending his proposal (for example, the opportunity cost of making speeches on the subject,
having to hold press conferences, sponsoring a media campaign in favor of the fiscal proposal, or
popularity loss due to the conflict with the rich).6 To simplify the exposition, I assume that the
government always has some incentive to compromise with the rich. That is, the cost of conflict
satisfies: k ≥ (1− p)(τg − τsq).
Using the simplifying assumption of linearity, the utility functions of the government and the
rich are, respectively:
ug(τ, ar) =− |τg − τ | − ark (1)
ur(τ, ar) =− α|τr − τ | − arcr, α ≥ 1 (2)
The timing and outcome of the game are as follows:
Timing:
1. Nature draws cr from a Uniform [0, 1];
2. The government chooses a tax rate b ∈ [0, 1];
3. After observing b and cr, the rich decides whether to engage in a political conflict: ar ∈ {0, 1}
Outcomes:
1. If the rich do not start a political conflict (ar = 0), the government’s proposed tax rate is
passed: τ = b
2. If the rich start a political conflict (ar = 1), with probability 1−p, the government’s proposed
tax rate is passed: τ = b, and with probability p, the status quo tax rate is upheld: τ = τsq.
The equilibrium concept used in this paper is Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) which
requires that at each decision node, a player chooses the action that maximizes her expected utility
given the strategy of the other player.7
Solving the model by backward induction, the rich choose to start a political conflict if and only
if the expected gain from a conflict is greater than its cost: cr ≤ αp(b− τsq). The government does
not know the cost of conflict to the rich, but anticipates that the risk of conflict when he chooses a
tax rate. The government, therefore, chooses a tax rate to equate the marginal benefit of a higher
tax rate with the marginal cost of an increase in the probability of political conflict.
Consequently, the government’s tax proposal depends on the marginal disutility of taxation for
the rich. When it is low, any increase in taxation is associated with a small increase in the risk of
conflict. The marginal benefit of an increase in the proposed tax rate is always greater than the
marginal cost, and the government proposes his ideal tax rate τg. When the marginal disutility
is high, any increase in the proposed tax rate results in a high increase in the risk of political
conflict, and the government upholds the status quo. In an intermediate range, there exists an
interior solution b ∈ (τsq, τg), and the government compromises with the rich. Observe that the
tax proposal of the government does not depend on the government’s ideal tax rate whenever the
marginal disutility of taxation for the rich is sufficiently high (α > α).
Proposition 1 The government’s tax proposal is:
b∗ =

τg if α ≤ α
τsq +
1
2αp2
− k
2p
if α ∈ [α, α]
τsq if α ≥ α
, (3)
with α = 1
2p2(τg−τsq)+pk and α =
1
pk
The role of an opposition party
In this section, I extend the baseline model discussed above to include a parliamentary op-
position. The government and the opposition have divergent preferences regarding taxation. The
opposition’s ideal tax rate is τo ∈ [τr, τsq]. The opposition can form a coalition with the government
before the latter proposes a tax rate: ao ∈ {A,R}, where ao = A denotes that the opposition agrees
to form a coalition. This coalition takes the form of an agreement on a tax proposal in exchange
for the opposition to bear part of the cost of a political conflict (for example, if the opposition
sends some of its members to speak in favor of the proposal or agrees not to press the government
on the issue during parliamentary question time, this deferred opportunity to gain political capital
at the expense of the government entails an opportunity cost). I assume that if the government
and opposition form a coalition, the opposition bears a proportion β ∈ (0, 1] of the cost k, with β
exogenously given.8 In addition, I suppose that the opposition might bear an additional cost z ≥ 0
if she forms a coalition and the rich engage in a political conflict. This cost can result from a loss
of political support, increased risk of the rich providing financial or logistic support to a primary
challenger (in the U.S.) or other parties (in countries with multiple right-wing or center-right par-
ties such as France, Italy, Germany or the Netherlands). While the utility function of the rich is
unchanged (see (2)), the government’s and opposition’s utility functions in this extended game are,
respectively:
ug(τ, ar, ao) =

−|τg − τ | − ar(1− β)k if ao = A
−|τg − τ | − ark if ao = R
(4)
uo(τ, ar, ao) =

−|τo − τ | − ar(βk + z) if ao = A
−|τo − τ | if ao = R
(5)
Notice that the opposition and the rich can have similar ideal tax rates (τo = τr). However, the
intensity of their preferences differs. The opposition does not have an informational advantage
over the government when it comes to the cost of conflict to the rich (likely because of the lack
of a credible private communication channel with the rich). As Propositions 2 and 3 show, the
opposition can still play an important role even when she does not provide additional information
to the government.
The timing of the extended game is:
1. Nature draws cr from a Uniform [0, 1];
2. The government proposes a tax rate bC ∈ [0, 1] to form a grand coalition;
3. The opposition accepts or rejects the coalition offer ao ∈ {A,R};
• If ao = A, the tax rate proposed is b = bC ;
• If ao = R, the government chooses a tax rate b ∈ [0, 1];
4. After observing b and cr, the rich decide whether to engage in a political conflict: ar ∈ {0, 1}
The outcomes of the game are the same as in the baseline model above. Observe that the baseline
model analyzed in the previous section is a special case of the model presented here. It corresponds
to the case when the opposition always rejects the government’s coalition offer (for example, because
z is very high).
The equilibrium concept is still SPNE. To solve the extended game, we start with the rich’s
decision of whether to start a political conflict. The rich face the same trade-off as before and
therefore choose to start a political conflict if and only if cr ≤ αp(b − τsq). When the opposition
rejects the offer of the government, the government faces the same trade-off as in the previous
section. Consequently, after ao = R, the government chooses b
∗ defined in Proposition 1.
When deciding whether to accept the government’s coalition proposal, the opposition anticipates
the government’s tax proposal if she were to reject his offer to form a coalition. The opposition, in
this scenario, also considers the probability that the rich engage in a political conflict. Therefore,
the opposition accepts the coalition offer if and only if her expected payoff is as high in a coalition
as outside of a coalition. The next lemma determines what type of offer the opposition accepts.
Lemma 1 For each β, there exists pˆ(β) ∈ (1/2, 1) such that if p ≤ pˆ(β) the opposition agrees to
form a coalition only if the government proposes bC ≤ bo with bo ≤ b∗.
As long as the probability that public opinion sides with the rich is not too high, the opposition
agrees to form a coalition with the government only if the government compromises by proposing
a lower tax rate than the optimal tax rate without a coalition, b∗.9 In what follows, I assume that
the condition on p stated in Lemma 1 holds.
The government on the contrary would rather propose a tax rate (weakly) greater than b∗ since
the opposition bears part of the cost of a political conflict. As a result, the government faces a
trade-off between reducing his cost of political conflict and passing a more moderate tax rate. To
minimize the cost of compromise, the government always offers bC = bo to form a grand coalition.
When the marginal disutility of taxation for the rich is low, the risk of conflict is low, and the
cost of compromise is greater than the benefit from reduced cost of conflict. When the marginal
disutility is high, the risk of political conflict is high, and the cost of compromise is lower than the
benefit from reduced cost of conflict.
Proposition 2 For each z, there exists α∗(z) ∈ [1, α) satisfying α∗(0) = 1 such that the govern-
ment and the opposition form a coalition if and only if α ≥ α∗(z).
Figure 1 illustrates the optimal choice of the government for two values of z (the political cost of
forming a coalition for the opposition). When z is low, the cost of compromising with the opposition
is low, and a coalition is formed even when the marginal disutility of taxation for the rich is small.
When z is high, the cost of compromising with the opposition is high, and a coalition is formed
only if there is a high marginal disutility of taxation.
[Figure 1 Here]
I now show that having the option to form a coalition is Pareto-improving. It benefits the
government because he has a greater choice set. The government is strictly better off whenever he
forms a grand coalition; that is, whenever the marginal disutility of taxation for the rich is high
(Proposition 2). By Lemma 1, the government proposes a more moderate tax rate whenever he
forms a grand coalition. This moderation strictly benefits the rich (whose expected utility only
depends on the proposed tax rate). The opposition is as well-off because she would reject any
offer which does not leave her at least indifferent between accepting and rejecting the government
coalition offer.10 Notice that this improvement does not come from a reduction in the waste caused
by a political conflict. In fact, the result still holds when a conflict occurs and waste increases after
a coalition is formed (i.e., z > 0).
Proposition 3 The ability to form a coalition is Pareto-improving.
Proposition 3 highlights a novel role for the parliamentary opposition. The opposition can be
seen as a force for moderation (as in Dewan and Spirling, 2011). Furthermore, she helps the
government compromise in a way which is beneficial for all political actors; she makes Pareto-
improving arrangements possible.11
Inequality and taxation
In this section, I relate the government’s tax proposal to the level of economic inequality. I first
consider the relationship between the government’s tax rate, and the marginal disutility of taxation
for the rich. In line with intuition, an increase in the marginal disutility of taxation decreases the
government’s tax proposal. When the government and the opposition do not form a coalition,
the government compromises to avoid a political conflict. The government must propose a more
moderate tax rate to form a coalition with the opposition since she bears part of the cost of conflict
(see Figure 1 for an illustration).
Lemma 2 The government’s equilibrium tax proposal b (b∗ or bo) decreases with α, strictly for
α ∈ (α, α).
To establish the relationship between inequality and the tax proposal, I consider a country
with fixed total income W and three income classes: the rich, the middle-class, and the poor.
The income of the rich satisfies wr ≥ W/3. Taxation finances redistribution, and to simplify the
exposition, I assume that there is no public good or transfer to the rich, who in turn consume all
their after-tax income (the ideal tax rate of the rich is thus τr = 0). I depart slightly from the
linear model and assume that the utility function of the rich is u(.), increasing and concave. Using
a Taylor expansion of the status quo tax rate, the utility function of the rich can be rewritten as:
u((1− τ)wr) ≈ u((1− τsq)wr)− wru′((1− τsq)wr)(τ − τsq)
≈ K − ατ (6)
where K = u((1− τsq)wr) +−wru′((1− τsq)wr)τsq is constant in the tax rate τ and α = wru′((1−
τsq)wr) corresponds to the marginal disutility of taxation. The effect of an increase in the income
of the rich on α is then:
dα
dwr
= u′((1− τsq)wr) + (1− τsq)wru′′((1− τsq)wr) (7)
An increase in the income of the rich has two effects. The first term on the right-hand side of (7)
corresponds to the level effect of an increase in wr on α. For a given tax rate, the amount taxed
increases as the rich become richer. This level effect increases the marginal disutility of taxation.
The second term on the right-hand side of (7) corresponds to the marginal effect of an increase
in wr on α. As the rich become richer, the value of each additional dollar decreases, as does the
marginal disutility of taxation. The presence of these level and marginal effects implies that the
effect of an increase in the income of the rich on their marginal disutility of taxation is ambiguous.
Given that W is assumed to be fixed, any increase in wr corresponds to an increase in inequal-
ity. Rewriting (7) as dα/dwr = u
′((1 − τsq)wr)(1 − R((1 − τsq)wr)), where R(w) = −u′′(w)wu′(w) is the
coefficient of relative risk aversion (RRA), I can study how an increase in inequality influences the
tax rate. When the RRA is high, the marginal effect always dominates the level effect. Conse-
quently, α decreases with wr, and the tax rate always increases with inequality. Inversely, when
the RRA is low, the marginal effect is always dominated by the level effect, and the tax rate always
decreases with inequality. When the RRA increases with the (after-tax) income of the rich, the
level effect can dominate the marginal effect at low levels of inequality, whereas the marginal effect
can dominate the level effect at high levels of inequality.
Proposition 4 Denote R(w) the coefficient of relative risk aversion (R(w) = −wu′′(w)/u′(w)).
1. If R((1− τsq)wr) > 1, ∀wr ∈ (W/3,W ), the tax rate proposed by the government increases with
inequality.
2. If R((1− τsq)wr) < 1, ∀wr ∈ (W/3,W ), the tax rate proposed by the government decreases with
inequality.
3. If R′(w) > 0 and R(W/3) < 1 < R(W ), the tax rate proposes by the government exhibits a
U-shaped relationship with inequality.
Proposition 4 indicates that the model predicts a U-shaped relationship between taxation and
inequality, as empirically documented by Figini (1999) and de Melo and Tiongson (2006), when
the RRA satisfies two conditions. First, the RRA must be increasing with income. This condition
is confirmed by several empirical studies (Holt and Laury, 2002; Post et al., 2008; Barseghyan et
al., 2011). Second, the RRA must vary around 1. Even though estimates of the RRA vary greatly,
Chetty (2006, Table 1) shows that estimates of the RRA based on income are close to 1 (and on
average lower than 1).
Figure 2 illustrates the U-shaped relationship between inequality and taxation using the RRA es-
timate from Holt and Laury (2002: 1653). The utility function of the rich is u(w) =
1−exp
(
−κw(1−ρ)
)
3κ
,
with κ = 0.029 and ρ = 0.269. The RRA is then R(w) = ρ+ κ(1− ρ)w(1−ρ), increasing in w. Sup-
pose W = 200 and τsq = 0.1. There exists wˆ ≈ 126.9 such that for all wr ≤ (≥)wˆ/(1 − τsq), the
tax rate decreases (increases) with inequality.
[Figure 2 Here]
The set-up studied in this paper provides an additional rationale for the empirically documented
U-shaped relationship between inequality and redistribution. As in Be´nabou (2000) and Rodriguez
(2004), this is a consequence of a higher level of participation by the rich in the political process.12
However, in this paper, the influence of the rich is unaffected by the (in)efficiency of taxation as in
Be´nabou (2000) or the availability of quid pro quo contributions or bribes as in Rodriguez (2004).
It is a result of the capacity of the rich to sway public opinion and impose a cost on the government
through a press campaign or grassroots mobilization.13
Conclusion
This paper analyzes a government’s fiscal decision when the rich can engage in a political conflict.
A political conflict is costly for the rich and the government, and it can sway public opinion and
force the government to abandon his fiscal project. I show that the marginal disutility of taxation
for the rich is a key variable in understanding the government’s tax proposal. When it is high, the
risk of political conflict is high, and the government compromises by proposing a very moderate
increase in taxes (or no change at all). When it is low, the risk of political conflict is low, and the
government proposes his ideal tax policy. This model highlights a new role for a parliamentary
opposition. The ability to form a coalition with the opposition is Pareto-improving. It also provides
an additional rationale for the empirically documented U-shaped relationship between inequality
and redistribution.
Even though the focus of this paper is on the ability of the rich to influence fiscal decisions, the
mechanism highlighted might apply more generally. For example, during the debate on President
Clinton’s health care reform in 1993, several special interest groups spent millions of dollars in
advertising to influence public opinion (for example, the “Harry and Louise” ad by the Health
Insurance Association of America). Extending the set-up to study special interest groups influence
more generally is left for future research.
Appendix
I first introduce some notation. Denote Vr(b, ar) the expected utility of the rich (over the
outcome of a political conflict) as a function of the government’s tax proposal b ∈ [0, 1] and their
decision to start a political conflict ar ∈ {0, 1}. Denote Vg(b, ao) and Vo(b, ao) the expected utility
of the government and the opposition respectively (over the probability of a political conflict and
its outcome) as a function of the government’s tax proposal and the opposition decision to accept
to form a coalition. The following conditions define an SPNE in pure strategies of the extended
game.14
Definition 1 The following conditions define a SPNE in pure strategies:
C1: The rich start a conflict (ar = 1) if and only if: Vr(b, 1) ≥ Vr(b, 0), ∀b ∈ [0, 1].
C2: When ao = R, the proposal chosen by the government is b
R such that: bR ∈ arg maxb∈[0,1] Vg(b, R)
C3: The opposition accepts (ao = A) the government’s offer b
C if and only if:
bC ∈ Bo = {b ∈ [0, 1]|Vo(b, A) ≥ Vo(bR, R)}
C4: The government offers bC = bA ∈ arg maxb∈Yo Vg(b, A) if and only if: Vg(bA, A) ≥ Vg(bR, R);
or else he proposes bB /∈ Bo
Given the timing and outcomes, the government always proposes b ≥ τsq. The expected utility
of the rich is after rearranging:
Vr(b, ar) = −α(b− τr) + ar(αp(b− τsq)− cr) (8)
When the rich start a political conflict (ar = 1), with probability p, the government is forced to
abandon his fiscal proposal and the status quo tax rate is upheld. The gain from starting a political
conflict is thus αp(b− τsq). The cost of a political conflict is cr. This cost is the private information
of the rich. Therefore, from the government and opposition’s perspective, the probability of a
political conflict as a function of b is:
Pr(ar = 1|b) = min{αp(b− τsq), 1} (9)
The expected utility of the government and the opposition are respectively.
Vg(b, ao) = Pr(ar = 1|b)(pug(0, 1, ao) + (1− p)ug(b, 1, ao)) + (1− Pr(ar = 1|b))ug(b, 0, ao) (10)
Vo(b, ao) = Pr(ar = 1|b)(puo(0, 1, ao) + (1− p)uo(b, 1, ao)) + (1− Pr(ar = 1|b))uo(b, 0, ao) (11)
Proof :[Proof of Proposition 1] First, notice that the government never chooses b > τg since it leads
to a lower payoff than b = τg and increases the risk of political conflict by (9). Furthermore, under
the assumption k ≥ (1 − p)(τg − τsq), conflict never occurs with probability 1 on the equilibrium
path. We can thus rewrite (10) as:
Vg(b, R) = −αp2(b− τsq)2 + αp(b− τsq)k + b− τg
The function Vg(b, R) is strictly concave in b. Therefore, there exists a unique maximum in
b ∈ [τsq, τg]. The claim holds by taking first order condition and simple computations. 
Proof :[Proof of Lemma 1] I show that there exists pˆ(β) > 1/2 such that for all p ≤ pˆ(β), V (1, A) <
V (b∗, R). We have:
Vo(b
∗, R) =αp2(b∗ − τsq)2 − b∗ + τo (12)
Vo(b, A) =Pr(ar = 1|b)(p(τo − τsq) + (1− p)(τo − b)− (βk + z)) + (1− Pr(ar = 1|b))(τo − b)
(13)
Notice that Vo(b, A) < Vo(b, R) for all b since β > 0. Furthermore, when b
∗ = τsq, Vo(b, A) <
Vo(τsq, R), ∀b ≥ τsq (all the terms in Vo(b, A) but one are negative or strictly smaller than τo− τsq).
Lastly, if V ′o(1, A) ≤ 0 or βk + z ≥ (1 − τsq), then Vo(b∗, R) > Vo(b, A), ∀b ≥ b∗. In what follows,
I thus restrict the analysis to α < α, V ′o(1, A) > 0, and βk < p(1 − τsq). Since Vo(b, A) is strictly
decreasing in z, I impose z = 0.
Consider the function f(b) = αp2(b − τsq)2 − b. This function has a unique minimum bˆ =
τsq +
1
2αp2
. As a polynomial of degree 2, f(b) is symmetric around bˆ. A necessary condition for
Vo(1, A) ≥ Vo(b∗, R) is f(1) > f(b) (otherwise Vo(1, R) < Vo(1, A) ≤ Vo(b∗, A)). Suppose b∗ = τg, we
have f(1) > f(b∗) if and only if 1− bˆ ≥ bˆ− τg (b∗ = τg if and only if τg ≤ τsq + 12αp2 − k2p < bˆ). Using
the definition of bˆ, this is equivalent to: α > 1
p2(1+τg−2τsq) . From (12), Vo(τg, R) is increasing with
α. Therefore, we have (after rearranging): Vo(τg, R) >
−(τg−τsq)(1−τsq)
(1−τsq)+(τg−τsq) − τsq + τo. From (13), given
p(1−τsq)−βk > 0 and k ≥ (1−p)(τg−τsq), we have: Vo(1, A) ≤ p(1−τsq)−β(1−p)(τg−τsq)−1+τo.
A necessary condition for Vo(1, A) ≥ V (τg, R) is: p(1 − τsq) − β(1 − p)(τg − τsq) − 1 + τo >
−(τg−τsq)(1−τsq)
(1−τsq)+(τg−τsq) − τsq + τo or equivalently: p− β(1− p)X > 1− X1+X , with X =
τg−τsq
1−τsq . The left-hand
side is strictly increasing with p and the inequality is always satisfied for p = 1 and never satisfied
for p = 1/2 since X ≤ 1 and β > 0. Hence, there exists pˆ(β) > 1/2 such that Vo(1, A) < Vo(τg, R)
for all p ≤ pˆ(β).
Suppose b∗ = τsq + 12αp2 − k2p . We have 1− bˆ > bˆ− b∗ = k2p if and only if α > 12p2(1−τsq)−pk . This
implies b∗ < 1− k
p
. Plugging this in (12) and using the fact that Vo(b
∗, R) is increasing with α and
f(b) decreasing with b for all b ≤ bˆ, we obtain after rearranging: Vo(b∗, R) > (1−τsq)
2
2(1−τsq)− kp
−1+τo. The
left-hand side is increasing with k for k ≤ 2p(1− τsq). Since b∗ < 1−k/p and b∗ ≥ τsq, we need k <
p(1− τsq. Since by assumption k ≥ (1−p)(τg− τsq), we get: Vo(b∗, R) > (1−τsq)
2
2(1−τsq)− 1−pp (τg−τsq)
−1 + τo.
As above, we have: Vo(1, A) ≤ p(1 − τsq) − β(1 − p)(τg − τsq) − 1 + τo. A necessary condition for
Vo(1, A) ≥ V (b∗, R) is: p(1 − τsq) − β(1 − p)(τg − τsq) − 1 + τo > (1−τsq)
2
2(1−τsq)− 1−pp (τg−τsq)
− 1 + τo or
equivalently: p− β(1− p)X > p
2p−(1−p)X , with X =
τg−τsq
1−τsq . The left-hand side is strictly increasing
with p, the right-hand side is strictly decreasing with p and this condition is always (never) satisfied
for p = 1 (p = 1/2). Hence, there exists pˆ(β) > 1/2 such that Vo(1, A) < Vo(τg, R) for all p ≤ pˆ(β).
The reasoning above implies that the opposition rejects any bC such that bC > b∗ whenever
p ≤ pˆ(β). This implies that Vo(b, A) can be rewritten without loss of generality as polynomial of
degree 2 in b.15 Therefore, when p ≤ pˆ(β), the set of acceptable offer Bo is Bo = [b, bo] with b some
tax proposal satisfying b ≤ τo and bo ≤ b∗. 
Lemma 3 To form a grand coalition the government proposes:
bC = bo = τsq +
1 + αp(βk + z)−
√
(1 + αp(βk + z))2 − 4αp2(b∗ − τsq)(1− αp2)
2αp2
(14)
Proof : By Lemma 1 and (13), Vo(b, A) = αp
2(b− τsq)2− b+ τo−αp(b− τsq)(βk+ z) for all b ∈ Bo.
Hence, bo is the smallest solution to the quadratic equation: Vo(b, A) = Vo(b
∗, R). 
Lemma 4 The government proposes bC = bo if and only if:
∆(bo, b
∗, z) = αp(b∗k + τsqz − bo(k + z)) ≥ 0 (15)
Proof : The government proposes bC = bo to form a coalition if and only if:
Vg(bo, A) ≥ Vg(b∗, R)
⇔ −αp2(bo − τsq)2 − αp(bo − τsq)(1− β)k + bo − τg ≥ −αp2(b∗ − τsq)2 − αp(b∗ − τsq)k + b∗ − τg
(16)
From the definition of bo (Lemma 3), we know that:
bo − αp2(bo − τsq)2 = b∗ − αp2(b∗ − τsq)2 − αp(bo − τsq)(βk + z) (17)
Plugging (17) into (16), we obtain: Vg(y
A, A) ≥ Vg(yR, R)⇔ αp(b∗ − bo)k − αp(bo − τsq)z ≥ 0

Proof :[Proof of Proposition 2] Observe that when z = 0, then (15) is always satisfied since b∗ ≥ bo.
Furthermore, from (14), when b∗ = τsq, then bo = τsq. Therefore, (15) is satisfied for all α ≥ α. In
what follows, I focus on z > 0 and α < α.
First consider the case when α < α so b∗ = τg. Rewrite (15) as: ∆˜(α) = αp[τgk+τsqz−bo(k+z)].
∆˜(α) has the same sign as τgk + τsqz − bo(k + z). I claim that bo is strictly decreasing with α on
[1, α) and verify the claim in the proof of Lemma 2. Therefore, ∆˜(α) can change sign at most once
(from negative to positive)
Suppose now that α ≥ α (the result can be proved first for α > α and then taking the limit, but,
as the proof makes clear, α = α is not a special case due to the continuity of b∗). We have: ∆˜(α) =
αp[b∗k+ τsqz− bo(k+ z)]. Using the definitions of b∗ (see (3)) and bo (see (14)) and rearranging, we
have that ∆˜(α) has the same sign as: ξ(α) = (k+z)
√
Φ1(α)−k(αp((1+β)k+z))−z(1+αp(βk+z)),
with Φ1(α) = (1 + αp(βk + z))
2−2(1−αpk)(1−αp2) a polynomial of degree 2 in α. By the reasoning
above, we have: ξ(α) = 0. Furthermore, after some algebra, we get: ξ′(α) = pk (k−p)(k+z)
k+z+βk
−pk2 < 0.
The solution to the equation ξ(α) = 0 is equivalent to (k + z)
√
Φ1(α) = k(αp((1 + β)k + z)) +
z(1 +αp(βk+ z)), which itself is equivalent to (since Φ1(α) > 0) Φ1(α) =
(
p((1 +β)k+ z)) + z(1 +
αp(βk + z))
)2
. This is a quadratic equation so ξ(α) = 0 has at most one solution in [α, α) (since
ξ(α) = 0). Given ξ′(α) < 0, I claim that this implies that i. if ξ(α) ≥ 0, then ξ(α) > 0, ∀α ∈ (α, α)
and ii. if ξ(α) < 0, then there exists a unique α∗ ∈ (α, α) such that ξ(α∗) = 0.
The proof of point i. is by contradiction. Suppose ξ(α) ≥ 0 and there exists α1 ∈ (α, α) such
that ξ(α1) < 0. The properties of ξ(.) at α = α imply that there must be at least two αˆ’s satisfying
αˆ < α¯ and ξ(αˆ) = 0. Since ξ(α) = 0 has at most one solution on (α, α), we have reached a
contradiction. To prove point ii., observe that the existence of α∗ is guaranteed by the properties
of ξ(.) at α = α. Uniqueness follows from a similar reasoning as above.
To summarize, the reasoning above implies that either 1) ∆˜(1) ≥ 0 and the government always
offers bC = bo (i.e., we have α
∗(z) = 1); or 2) there exists a unique α∗(z) ∈ (1, α) such that,
∆˜(α) < 0, ∀α < α∗(z) and ∆˜(α) ≥ 0, ∀α ≥ α∗(z) (the dependence on z follows from the definitions
of bo and ∆˜(α)). 
Proof :[Proof of Proposition 3] When the government proposes bC /∈ Bo, he gets Vg(b∗, R) therefore
he is as well off as when a coalition is impossible. By Definition 1, the government is better off
when he forms a grand coalition, i.e., for all α ≥ α∗(z). By the proof of Proposition 2, he is strictly
better off for all α ∈ (α∗(z), α) (this interval is not empty). By Lemma 3, the opposition is as well
off when a coalition is possible as when it is impossible. By (8), the expected utility of the rich
decreases with b. Since bo ≤ b∗, the rich are at least as well off when a coalition is possible. In fact,
for all α ∈ [α∗(z), α), we have bo < b∗ and the rich are strictly better off. 
Proof :[Proof of Lemma 2] b∗ is weakly decreasing with α by inspection of (3) (strictly for α ∈
(α, α)). By Lemma 3, bo is the smallest root of the quadratic equation Vo(b, A) = Vo(b
∗, R), with
Vo(b, A) = αp
2(b − τsq)2 − b + τo − αp(b − τsq)(βk + z). From the proof of Lemma 1, we have
V ′o(b
∗, R) < 0. By the Implicit Function Theorem, we have: ∂bo
∂α
V ′o(b0, A) = p(bo − τsq)((βk + z) −
p(bo − τsq)) + V ′o(b∗, R)∂b
∗
∂α
+ ∂Vo(b
∗,R)
∂α
.16 By (12), we have: ∂bo
∂α
V ′o(b0, A) = p(bo − τsq)(βk + z) +
p2
(
(b∗ − τsq)2 − (bo − τsq)2
)
+ V ′o(b
∗, R)∂b
∗
∂α
. The right-hand side is positive (strictly for α < α).
Hence, we have ∂bo/∂α ≤ 0 (strictly for α < α). 
Proof :[Proof of Proposition 4] The proof follows from the reasoning in the text and Lemma 2. 
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Notes
1For more details on the Cartel des Gauches, see Soulie´ (1962) and Jeanneney (1977).
2Be´nabou (2000) and Rodriguez (2004) also provide a theoretical explanation for this U-shaped
relationship. In Be´nabou (2000), this relationship is driven by change in the efficiency of taxation
with inequality. In Rodriguez (2004), it is the consequence of a change in the amount available
for redistribution. Rodriguez’s (2004) explanation relies on the ability for the rich to buy tax
exemptions with contributions. However, contributions face legal limits in most OECD countries
(Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2012) and have a weak effect on political deci-
sions in the U.S. (Ansolabehere et al., 2003).
3The finding that a third party makes Pareto-improving arrangements possible in a conflict also
complements the literature on bargaining under the threat of conflict (Banks, 1990; Fearon, 1995).
4The ideal tax rate of the rich need not be 0 if taxes pay for public goods which the rich consume
(such as roads or airports).
5The efforts by the rich can have an impact on the public’s opinion of the government’s fiscal
proposal if the rich provide information about the impact of this policy as in Gu¨l and Pesendorfer’s
(2012) War of Information.
6Politicians are aware of the risk of groups mobilizing against them and behave strategically to
avoid these conflicts as documented by surveys of Members of the U.S. Congress (Fenno, Jr., 1978;
Kingdon, 1981; and Wolpe, 1990).
7A formal definition of the equilibrium can be found in the appendix.
8In an Online Appendix, I endogenize the optimal contract for the government and show that
the government would like the opposition to bear as high a proportion of the cost of political conflict
as possible.
9When p is very large, the opposition might accept a very high tax rate to induce the rich to
start a conflict and obtain the status quo tax rate.
10Observe that the opposition is necessarily indifferent because the government makes a take-
it-or-leave-it offer. If the bargaining process is more balanced (for example, a Nash bargaining),
Lemma 1 and Proposition 2 hold, and the opposition is then strictly better off. As such, the ability
to form a coalition can be strict Pareto-improving.
11In Iaryczower and Santiago (2014), a minority party can serve as a deal-broker between two
other parties. However, the presence of a deal-broker is not Pareto-improving in their set-up.
12Several theoretical papers predict a decreasing relationship between inequality and redistribu-
tion. This includes the analysis of social mobility (Be´nabou and Ok, 2001), differences in beliefs
(Be´nabou and Tirole 2006), and the rich’s manipulation of the electoral agenda (Roemer 1998
and Lee and Roemer 2006). When the tax base depends on investment in education or capital
complemented by public spending, Lee and Roemer (1998 and 1999) find an inverted U-shaped
relationship between inequality and redistribution.
13An increase in inequality might have an impact on the identity of the party in power. It might
also change the preferences of the party favoring taxation. However, unlike in Meltzer and Richard
(1981), the preferences of the party in power has no impact on the tax proposal whenever the
marginal disutility of taxation is sufficiently high (see (3) and (14)). Nonetheless, since the present
paper studies a one-shot game, it is not adapted to study the steady state tax rate. A dynamic
game approach to determine the steady state tax rate is left for future research.
14The focus on pure strategies SPNE is without loss of generality. Observe that conditions C2
and C3 define an SPNE in pure strategies for the baseline model.
15Observe that Pr(ar|b∗) < 1.
16The function Vo(b
∗, R) and consequently bo as a kink at α = α so the Implicit Function Theorem
can be applied only on the intervals [1, α) and (α,∞). However by taking the limits, we can see
that the result holds as α→ α.
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